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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040502-CA

vs.
WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Paul G. Maughan presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to
consider the petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004).
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: May a robber who has one hand in his pocket, gesturing like he has a gun, be
charged with aggravated robbery under Utah law?
Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of a statute is reviewed for correctness.
State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, If 6, 63 P.3d 667.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal and reproduced in pertinent part:
A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon
as defined in Section 76-1-601;

(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor
vehicle.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004);
"Dangerous weapon" means
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of
the item leads the victim to reasonably believe
the item is likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or
in any other manner that he is in control of such an item.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Information dated December 9, 2003, with aggravated
robbery, a first-degree felony, and theft of services, a class B misdemeanor. R. 6-7. The
Information alleged that defendant robbed a downtown jewelry store on December 6, 2003.
Defendant filed a motion to reduce the robbery charge from a first- to a second-degree
felony. R. 38. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and heard arguments on March 17,
2004. R. 114. The court denied the motion by minute entry on March 29, 2004, R. 52, then
issued a memorandum decision on April 2, 2004. R. 54-61.
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to aggravated robbery on April 4, 2004,
specifically preserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to reduce the charge. R. 73.
On June 7,2004, defendant was sentenced to zero to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. R.
94.
On June 11, 2004, defendant filed a notice of appeal. R. 96.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
"Bristly"
Other than needing a shave, defendant's appearance on the day he robbed a Gateway
Mall jewelry store was fairly ordinary. R. 114:17 (Transcript of Motion Hearing, dated
March 17, 2004, attached as Addendum B).
"I noticed that he had on a thick puffy coat and he had on a beanie," recalled Jeffrey
Reinkoester, a sales associate at the store. "I noticed that he was very bristly, didn't shave in
a day or two, and that he was coming very determined into the store." Id.
Reinkoester greeted defendant like any ordinary customer.
"Hello," Reinkoester said. R. 114:9.
Defendant's response was to the point: "I want you to go and get me all the money in
the cash drawer right now." R. 114:9.
"I'm not kidding," defendant added. "Hurry." R. 114:20.
As defendant made this demand, he pointed at Reinkoester with his right hand, which
he kept concealed in the pocket of his coat. R. 114:11.
"There was one hand in a pocket, gesturing like there was a gun," Reinkoester
recalled. R. 114:11.
"Do you want the change? "
Reinkoester immediately moved behind the counter toward the cash register. R.
114:20-21. Defendant tracked Reinkoester's movements and continued to point with the
hand in his pocket. R. 114:12, 13, 21. Reinkoester opened the cash register and began
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retrieving money. However, there was not much in the till and defendant was not pleased.
R. 114:13.
"Is that all you've got?" defendant asked after Reinkoester filled a bag with the cash.
Id
"Yes," Reinkoester said. Then he held out a roll of quarters. "Do you want the
change?" Id.
Defendant replied: "Fill it with jewelry." Id
Apparently changing his mind, defendant stated, "Just give it to me." He then took the
bag and ran to the front door. R. 114:15.
The chase
Nelson Fortier, the storeowner, apparently realized a robbery was in progress and
attempted to block defendant's way. Id.
"Don't block the fucking door," defendant said, pushing Fortier out of the way. Id.;
R. 7.
Fortier allowed defendant to leave, but then chased after him. R. 114:15. Once
outside, defendant climbed into a cab, but Fortier told the driver not to leave because
defendant had just robbed the jewelry store. R. 7. Defendant then exited the cab and ran off
with Fortier still in pursuit. Id. Fortier finally caught up with defendant and demanded he
return the money. Defendant complied, then ran off again, but was later arrested. Id. at 7-8.
The motion hearing
On March 17, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to reduce the
aggravated robbery charge to simple robbery. R. 114. Defendant claimed that the
4

aggravated robbery charge was not proper under Utah law because he had not used or
threatened to use a "dangerous weapon" as that term is defined in Utah law. R. 38-44.
In opposing the motion, the State argued that the aggravated robbery statutes, when
properly interpreted in light of Utah caselaw, covers situations in which non-verbal
conduct—such as defendant's coat-pocket pointing gesture—constitutes a "representation"
of a dangerous weapon, which is punishable just as if the defendant actually possessed such a
weapon. R. 42-44.
Reinkoester was the sole witness to testify at the hearing. His testimony was that he
believed defendant had a gun, even though he never saw one and even though defendant did
not verbally claim to have one:
Q. And after he said get me the money in the cash drawer, what did you do?
A. [by Reinkoester] I said all right. I circled around and came behind the cash drawer
and we met over there and I proceeded on getting the cash.
Q. Why did you do that?
A. Because I thought he had a weapon.
Q. Did he say he had a weapon?
A. No.
Q. What was it that led you to believe he had a weapon?
A. The motioning in the coat pocket.
R. 114:13.
Q. Why didn't you say anything to Dominique [another store worker]?
A. Fear
5

Q. Fear of what?
A. Fear of reprisal from the suspect.
Q. In what way?
A. Maybe being shot.
R. 114:27.
On April 2, 2004, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision denying defendant's
motion. R. 54-60. See Memorandum Decision, dated April 2,2004, attached as Addendum B.
The court stated that defendant was properly charged with aggravated robbery because the coatpocket gesture constituted a representation of a dangerous weapon:
It defies logic to allow a defendant to induce victim to believe the
defendant has a weapon and thereby coerce a victim to perform some act based on
the defendant's representations and then allow the defendant to benefit when it is
later shown the defendant in fact had no such weapon. The Court finds in this
case that the defendant's placement of his hand in his pocket and the gesturing
accompanying it, as testified to by the witness, constituted a representation.
Therefore, the State is within its discretion in charging this matter as a first-degree
felony.
R. 58 (see Memorandum Decision attached as Addendum B).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant is incorrect in claiming that the trial court erred in holding that a robber
who feigns possession of a handgun is guilty of aggravated robbery. First, under the plain
meaning of Utah statutes defining aggravated robbery, a robber who simulates possession of
a weapon by keeping his hand in his pocket and pointing at his victim is guilty of aggravated
robbery. Second, Utah appellate courts have held that a robber's non-verbal conduct, such as
defendant's coat-pocket gesture, can constitute a "representation" of a "dangerous weapon"
6

under Utah law, thus meeting the elements of aggravated robbery. Third, the majority of
jurisdictions with analogous statutes have held that non-verbal conduct alone is sufficient to
constitute a representation of a dangerous weapon and that a robber who makes such a
representation may be convicted of aggravated or armed robbery.
ARGUMENT
L

UNDER THE PLAIN MEANING OF UTAH'S STATUTES,
DEFENDANT'S COMMISSION OF A ROBBERY WHILE
HOLDING HIS HAND IN HIS POCKET TO "REPRESENT" A
"DANGEROUS WEAPON" MEETS THE ELEMENTS OF
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.

Defendant claims that under Utah law, he cannot be found guilty of aggravated robbery
because he did not verbally represent that he had a gun5 Aplt. Br. at 9, even though he pointed
toward the victim with his hand in his coat pocket in a manner that is almost universally
recognized to indicate the presence of a gun. A plain reading of Utah statutes defining
aggravated robbery show defendant's claim is meritless.
In construing a statute, this Court must attempt to "'ascertain and effectuate the
Legislature's intent.'" State v. Hunt, 906 R.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). The
Legislature's intent and purpose is most often evident from the plain language of the statute. Id.
If possible, the statutory language should be given a literal meaning. State v. Ewell, 886 P.2d
1260, 1363 (Utah App. 1993). Where the plain language of statute is clear, there is no need to
look further. Lovendahlv. Jordan School District, 2002 UT 130, H 58, 63 P.3d 705 (Durrant, J.,
concurring and dissenting with two justices concurring); see also Okeefe v. Utah State
Retirement Board, 956 R.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998) (the term "overtime" is clear and
unambiguous and the court has "no need to resort to other methods of construction"); Visitor
7

Auth. Info. Cntr. v. Customer Service Division, 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997) ("Unless the
statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find no need to delve into the uncertain facts of
legislative history55); Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017,
1020 (Utah 1995) ("When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it
expresses, and no room is left for construction55). A reviewing court should not add or subtract
statutory terms. Reinkrautv. Shalala, 854 F. Supp. 838, 841 (D.Utah 1994). "Under the plain
meaning rule, we seek the meaning of the statute from its very language, and if it is
straightforward, we simply enforce it according to its terms. Its words then bear 'their ordinary
meaning and the statute is not to be read so as to add or subtract from [that] which is state.. ,555
Gardener v. Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d 729, 736 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
Under Utah law, a person commits simple robbery if he or she "unlawfully and
intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession of another from his
person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means offeree or fear, and with a purpose or
intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal property; . . .55 Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (West 2004). By contrast, a person commits aggravated robbery if in
course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon
as defined in Section 76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor
vehicle.
Utah Code Ann § 76-6-302 (emphasis added). "Dangerous weapon55 means:
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of
8

the item leads the victim to reasonably believe
the item is likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury, or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or
in any other manner that he is in control of such an item.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-601(5) (West 2004) (emphasis added).
Thus, to be charged with aggravated robbery, a defendant must either use or threaten to
use a "dangerous weapon," which is "any item capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury [] or a facsimile or representation of the item." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-60 l(5)(a) & (b)
(emphasis added). According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2382 (1993),
"threaten" means "to give signs of the approach of (something evil or unpleasant): indicate as
impending: portend".1 For Reinkoester—or, indeed, any store clerk or teller faced with such a
coat-pocket gesture—the "approaching evil" was the possibility of being shot with a "dangerous
weapon." A "facsimile," according to Webster's, is "an exact and detailed copy of something."
Id, at 813. For example, a toy gun or a replica of a gun would be a facsimile. There is no
allegation that defendant used a facsimile; rather, he is accused of using a "representation" of a
dangerous weapon. When defendant placed his hand in his pocket and pointed toward
Reinkoester, he intentionally represented that he had a dangerous weapon, to wit: a handgun. He
did so non-verbally by "portrayal or delineation... in a visible image or form." See Webster's at
1926. Finally, defendant's "use or apparent intended use of the item [led] the victim to
reasonably believe the item [was] likely to cause death or serious bodily injury;..." Utah Code

1

"In the case of unambiguous statutes, this court has a long history of relying on
dictionary definitions to determine plain meaning." State v. Redd, 1999 UT 1084 11, " 2 p - 2 d
986 (Utah 1996).
9

Ann. § 76-6-60 l(5)(b)(I). Something is "apparent" if it is "capable of easy perception^]
readily perceptible to the senses, esp sight[;]. .. Readily manifest to the senses or mind as
real or true and supported by credible evidence . . . " Webster's at 102. Again, such a coatpocket gesture has a meaning that is "readily perceptible: "I have a gun and Fm prepared to
use it."
Indeed, Reinkoester testified that he complied with the demands precisely because he
believed defendant may have a gun concealed in his coat pocket and was pointing it at him while
demanding money and jewels:
Q. And after he said get me the money in the cash drawer, what did you do?
A. [by Reinkoester] I said all right. I circled around and came behind the cash drawer
and we met over there and I proceeded on getting the cash.
Q. Why did you do that?
A. Because I thought he had a weapon.
Q. Did he say he had a weapon?
A. No.
Q. What was it that led you to believe he had a weapon?
A. The motioning in the coat pocket.
R. 114:13.
Q. Why didn't you say anything to Dominique [another store worker]?
A. Fear
Q. Fear of what?
A. Fear of reprisal from the suspect.
10

Q. In what way?
A. Maybe being shot.
R. 114:27.
In short, under the plain meaning of the statutes, defendant robbed the jewelry store by
using the "representation" of a "dangerous weapon" to threaten Reinkoester and force him to
comply with defendant's demands. Defendant is, accordingly, guilty of aggravated robbery.
II.

DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
BECAUSE HIS NON-VERBAL CONDUCT CREATED THE
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE BELIEF THAT HE POSSESSED A
DANGEROUS WEAPON,

Defendant insists that gestures cannot convey a threat under Utah law unless
accompanied by a verbal declaration, such as "I have a gun." Defendant claims that if a he
could be convicted based on his non-verbal representation that he was in possession of a
weapon, the distinction between simple and aggravated robbery would be lost because it would
leave the aggravating factor—the presence of a dangerous weapon—up to the "'caprice of the
victim's subjective evaluation.'" Aplt. Br. at 7 (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 721
S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. 1986)). "The trial court in this case improperly focused on the witness's
subjective belief rather than on the objective facts of what [defendant] did in concluding that the
charge should not be reduced to simple robbery." Id. at 12.
Utah law contradicts defendant's claim that non-verbal conduct is insufficient to
communicate a threat with a dangerous weapon. In State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277 (Utah
App. 1995), this Court upheld the aggravated robbery conviction of a defendant who told the
victim he had a gun, although he did not display a weapon or anything that appeared to be a
11

weapon. Id. at 277. In the opinion, this Court carefully distinguished between a "facsimile,"
which is "an exact and detailed copy," and "representation," which
is an expansive term, and, while it can mean "a likeness,
picture, model, or other reproduction," it can also refer to "a
statement or account especially] made to convey. . .[an]
impression of something with the intention of influencing . . .
action."
Candelario, 909 R.2d at 278 (citing Webster's Third New Int 7 Dictionary 813, 1926 (1986))
(emphasis added). This holding clearly states that "representation" has a variety of meanings
including "a likeness, picture, model, or other reproduction" or "a statement." Id. Moreover,
"such a statement can be either in the form of a verbal assertion or nonverbal action'' Id .at n.2
(emphasis added).

Thus, under the correct interpretation and application of Utah law,

defendant's use of his finger or other artifice during the course of the robbery was "nonverbal
action" that constituted "a statement" that defendant was armed; it was also a "likeness, model
or other reproduction" of a gun.
The conclusion that non-verbal action alone may constitute sufficient objective evidence
of a threat with a dangerous weapon has been echoed in other jurisdictions with similar
aggravated robbery statutes. For example, in People v. Taylor, 628 N.W.2d 55 (Mich. App.
2001), defendant claimed a fatal lack of "objective" evidence to support his conviction for the
armed robbery of a convenience store because he merely held a hand inside his jacket and pants
while telling the cashier "This is a stick up" and "Open the [cash] drawer." Id. at 58. In
Michigan, armed robbery is committed when the robber is "armed with a dangerous weapon, or
any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the person so assaulted to reasonably believe it

12

to be a dangerous weapon . . . " Id. at 57 (citing Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.797). In affirming that
defendant committed armed robbery by placing his hand in his jacket and pants, the court stated:
While this portion of the armed robbery statute focuses on the belief of the victim
that the defendant was armed, that belief must be reasonable and our courts have
long recognized that the victim's subjective belief alone is insufficient to support
a conviction of armed robbery
Therefore, the prosecutor must submit "some
objective evidence of the existence of a weapon or article" to the finder of fact.
Id. at 59 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). The court found the evidence against the
defendant
went well beyond a mere subjective belief that defendant was armed during the
robbery. Rather, there was ample objective evidence that defendant either had a
gun or simulated one so as to deliberately lead complainant to "reasonably
believe" he had a gun. Complainant testified that, during the robbery, defendant
placed his hand inside his jacket and into the front of his pants. Objectively,
defendant could have carried a weapon under his jacket and in his waistband.
Id. at 61.
The court also explicitly rejected the defendant's contention that a gesture simulating the
presence of a weapon must be backed up by some kind of verbal statement.
[W]e decline to hold that a defendant must verbally threaten the victim with some
specific bodily harm in order to obtain a conviction of armed robbery. If there is
sufficient evidence that, during the course of the robbery, the defendant simulates
a weapon so as to induce the victim to reasonably believe he is armed and, by
word or conduct, threatens the victim by announcing a robbery or otherwise
suggesting the potential use of the weapon, then the defendant may be convicted
of armed robbery.
Id.
This view is consistent with the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue.
See, e.g., Lynn Considine Cobb, Annotation, Robbery by Means of Toy or Simulated Gun or
Pistol, 81 A.L.R.3d 1006. For example, mFaulkner v. State, 581 S.E.2d 365 (Ga. App. 2003),
13

the defendant entered a tanning salon with a white sock covering his hand. As he approached
the cash register, an employee saw that the sock concealed something shaped like a gun.
Defendant pressed the sock into the employee's back and told her to open the register. The
employee testified that something in the sock "felt like .. .a gun/5 that she believed it was a gun
and that she was afraid. Id. at 366-67. Defendant was convicted of armed robbery—the taking of
property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another "by use of an
offensive weapon, or any replica, article, or device having the appearance of such weapon."/d at
367. The defendant claimed the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for armed
robbery because there was no evidence of a weapon and no evidence that the victim's
apprehension was reasonable. Id. The appellate court disagreed, noting that although the
defendant "may not have displayed a gun to the tanning salon employee, the evidence authorized
a finding that he used an article that had the appearance of a gun to persuade her to comply with
his demand and that his acts created a reasonable apprehension on her part that he was
threatening her with a gun." Id.
In State v. Arena, 663 A.2d 972, 978 (Conn. 1995), the court considered whether a
defendant convicted of armed robbery was entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction
because an object concealed in a plastic bag could have been something other than a gun. In
Connecticut, a defendant commits armed robbery if, in the course of the robbery, he "displays or
threatens the use of what he represents by his words or conduct to be a pistol, revolver, rifle,
shotgun, machine gun or other firearm .. ." Id. at 973, n.l. (citing Conn. Gen Stat. § 53a-134.
Witnesses testified that the defendant approached a checkout counter and stated, "Put all the
money in a bag." At the same time, the defendant placed an opaque plastic shopping bag on the
14

counter and pointed it at the checker. The bag contained an object that was cylindrical and about
16 inches long, which the checker testified looked like a gun. Id. at 974. The defendant
requested a lesser-included-offense instruction based on testimony from one witness who, on
cross-examination, agreed that the object inside the bag could have been a club. Id. at 978. The
trial court denied the defendant's request for a lesser-included-offense instruction and the
Connecticut Supreme Court agreed. "The state only had to prove that the defendant represented
by his conduct that he had a firearm. The actual contents of the bag are irrelevant. There is no
evidence that the defendant represented by his words or conduct that he had something other
than a firearm." Id. (emphasis in original).
InPeople v. Lopez, 135 A.D.2d 443 (N.Y. App. 1987), defendant approached the victim
and stated, "[T]his is a stick up, give me your radio." At the same time, defendant placed his
hand inside his vest pocket, "as if he had a gun." Id. at 443. The victim, believing defendant had
a gun, turned over his radio. Id. Defendant was tried and convicted of two counts of robbery,
one involving the use of a weapon. Id. at 443; see also N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15 (McKinney's)
(armed robbery occurs when defendant "[u]ses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous
instrument; or . . . [djisplays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun
or other firearm.. ."). However, the trial court dismissed the weapon-related count on motion
from defendant because, even though defendant placed his hand in his vest, "his hand never
formed the shape of any object." Id. The New York appellate court reversed, noting that "there
is no requirement that the object need be anything other than the defendant's hand." Id. at 44344. "Where an unarmed robber holds his hand in his pocket so as to give the impression that he
is holding a gun, he has '[d]isplay[ed] what appears to be . . . a firearm' within the meaning of
15

the statute.' Id. at 444.
In State v. Ellison, 819 P.2d 1010 (Ariz. App. 1991), the court held that defendant and an
accomplice were guilty of armed robbery because they were either "armed with a
deadly weapon or a simulated deadly weapon" or "use[d] or threatened] to use a deadly
weapon or dangerous instrument or a simulated deadly weapon." Id. at 1012 (citing Arizona
Revised Statues § 13- 1904(A)). "They committed the robberies by positioning their hands to
make their hands appear as if they instead were deadly weapons." Id. at 1013.
The foregoing authority demonstrates that the vast majority ofjurisdictions interpreting
statutory language similar to Utah's have found that non-verbal communication, including the
unequivocal gestures indicating the presence of a gun, are sufficient to establish armed or
aggravated robbery. These cases show that the trial court's decision is consistent with Utah
precedent and with the law in many if not most of the jurisdictions in the country. The trial
court's decision and defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
III.

VICTIMS SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO VERIFY THAT A
WOULD-BE ROBBER IS ACTUALLY IN POSSESSION OF A
WEAPON.

In rejecting defendant's motion to reduce the charges against him from aggravated
robbery to simple robbery, the trial court made an important observation: "[I]t is not fair,
reasonable or wise to place the burden upon a witness to inquire whether or not a bulge in
the defendant's pocket is or is not a weapon." R. 58 (Memorandum Decision, Addendum
B).
Other courts have voiced similar concerns about placing the onus on the victim to
challenge the robber to prove that he actually possess a weapon. For example, m Aaron v. Kelly,
16

65 F. Supp.2d 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), the court held that the defendant was properly convicted
under a New York statute that enhanced the crime of robbery if the robber "[displays what
appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm. . ." Id. at 185
(citing N.Y.Penal Law § 160.10(2)(b)). The defendant was convicted of sneaking into a dorm
house and robbing two students. While fleeing from one of the students, the defendant put his
hand in his pocket and, in a "threatening manner," told the student chasing him to be quiet. Id.
at 184. In rejecting the defendant's claim this his gesture alone was insufficient under the
statute, the court noted that New York caselaw had long held that that"' display of anything that
appears to be [a firearm], though held inside a coat or otherwise obscured, is covered' by the
law," thus elevating the level of offense for displaying what appears to be a firearm. Id. at 187.
The court also stated that even if the student who pursued the defendant
was in fact uncertain as to whether [defendant] had a gun or a knife, that would
not affect the propriety of his conviction under New York law. "A robbery victim
is not, in our view, required to call a robber's bluff, in order to allay any lingering
uncertainty, before the armed offense is made out."
Id. at 187 (citing People v. Bynum, 125 A.D.2d 207, 209, 509 N.Y.S.2d 321, 323 (1st Dep't
1986), affd, 70 N.Y.2d 858, 523 N.Y.S.2d 492, 518 N.E.2d 4 (1987)).
The dangers of requiring a robbery victim to confirm that the hand or bulge in the
robber's pocket is an actual weapon are apparent. It is inevitable that the clerk who is required
to verify the existence of a weapon will end up injured or worse when it turns out that the robber
has a real weapon. This Court should not adopt a policy that encourages such potentially
disastrous confrontations.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J T % y of December, 2004
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General

18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the lo day of December 20041 mailed a copy of the foregoing to:
Joan C. Watt
Michael A. Peterson
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

19

Addenda

Addendum A

OflTW (h^)&* *n 3- 0^

ORIGINAL

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,

) Case No. 031908349
Transcript of:

vs.

MOTION HEARING

WILLIAM IRELAND,
Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE PAUL G. MAUGHAN, JUDGE

SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-1860

MARCH 17, 2004

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JUL 1 h 2004

FILED DISTRICT C00RT
Third Judicial District

MAR 13 2004
REPORTED BY:

SALT LAKE COUNTY

KATHLEEN SCHULTZ, CSR
TT

Deputy Clerk

.-CA

1 I

A P P E A R A N C E S

2

3 I For the P l a i n t i f f :
4 |

5 |
6 |
7 |

DAVID E . YOCOM

SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
By: GREGORY L. BOWN
Deputy District Attorney
Salt Lake County
111 East Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

8
9 I For the Defendant:
10 I
11 I
12 I

MICHAEL A. PETERSON
Attorney at Law
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

13
* * *

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I N D E X

WITNESSES
4

5 I ANDREW REINKOESTER
6 I
7 |

Direct Examination by MR. BOWN
Cross-Examination by MR. PETERSON
Redirect Examination by MR. BOWN
Recross Examination by MR. PETERSON

8

9 I
10
11

EXHIBITS
PAGE
INTRODUCED DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 1

12 I RECEIVED DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 1
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

24
26

Salt Lake City, Utah; Wednesday, March 17, 2004; a.m.
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Good morning.

State of Utah versus

William Joseph Ireland, case ending 8349.
Counsel, will you make your appearances for the
record.
MR. PETERSON:

Mike Peterson representing

Mr. Ireland, who is present.
MR. BOWN:
THE COURT:

Greg Bown appearing for the State.
And Mr. Ireland is with us?

MR. PETERSON:

He is.

Your Honor, during the course of this hearing I'm
wondering if I could ask the Court to allow the unshackling of
his writing hand so he can assist me.
THE COURT:

We'll leave him shackled.

How many witnesses will you have?
MR. BOWN:
shown up.

I have two, your Honor, but one has not

But I do have Andrew Reinkoester, who is here, my

only witness.
THE COURT:

Do you want to have him come up and be

THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear to tell the truth,

sworn.

the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Before you begin, Mr. Peterson, my
4

understanding is this matter was set for jury trial, the trial
has been cancelled and the sole issue today is whether or not
Mr. Ireland is guilty of a first-degree felony or a
second-degree felony.
MR. BOWN:

Yes, your Honor.

The exact issue is the

use of a dangerous weapon during the course of committing a
robbery.
THE COURT:

Can you establish this and go forward

with just one witness?
MR. BOWN:

I believe so, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. You may proceed.

ANDREW REINKDESTER
called as a witness in behalf of the State, having
first been duly sworn, was examined and testified as
follows:

DIRECT EXAMDQATICN
BY MR. BOWN:
Q

Will you state your name, please.

A

Andrew Jeffrey Reinkoester.

Q

Please spell your last name.

A

R-E-I-N-K-O-E-S-T-E-R.

Q

Calling your attention to December 6th of 2003, were

you working on that day?
A

Yes.

Q

Where did you work?
5

A

At Fortier Jewelers.

Q

Where is that located?

A

That is at the northern end of Gateway Mall complex.

Q

11 South Rio Grand?

A

Yes.

Q

Was that in Salt Lake County?

A

Yes.

Q

And what do you do there?

A

I am a sales associate for the store.

Q

On December 16th, in the afternoon, did anything

unusual happen?
MR. PETERSON:
MR. BOWN:

Excuse me.

MR. PETERSON:
Q

Excuse me.

It's December 6th.

What did I say?

The 16th.

(BY MR. BOWN)

December the 6th.

A

Yes.

We were robbed.

Q

About what time did this occur?

A

Between four and five o'clock.

Q

Describe what you saw the person -- did the person

rob you?
A

Yes.

Q

This person who robbed you, where was this person

when you very first saw this person?
A

Outside the store, coming towards the store.
MR. BOWN:

Okay.

I think it might be helpful, your
6

Honor, as we develop testimony, that he do a diagram of the
interior of the store so we can have some idea of what he's
doing.
THE COURT:

You may.

If you want to pull that board

out, you can write on it, the drawing board.
Q

(BY MR. BOWN)

Now, what I would like you to

do, Mr. Reinkoester, is do a diagram of the interior of Fortier
Jewelry, and if you can keep it up high, that allows everybody
to see where it was.

And it's a blue marker to begin with, and

just do the interior, not where everybody was, just the
interior.
A

Okay.

Q

Could you draw the exterior walls as well?

A

Sure.

Q

Okay.

Now, why don't you step just to this side, if

you would, and describe what it is that you have drawn.
A

Okay.

This is the entrance to the store, and these

represent jewelry cases right here, here, and here.

And this

is the front desk.
Q

Okay.

Now, for the record, the first indication that

you had that you made was the - - a t the top of the diagram
there is a broken - - a line that is -A

Broken.

Q

-- broken.

A

Yes.
7

Q

That is the door?

A

That is the door.

Q

Does it swing inside or outside?

A

It does both.

Q

Looks like elbows/ elbow-shaped boxes, three of them.

Those are what?
A

Those are the jewelry cases.

Q

And there are spaces between those, right?

A

Right.

Q

What's there?

A

Like here?

That's just a walkway to the center of

store.
Q

Then there's a rectangular box.

A

That is the front desk.

Q

Okay.

What is that?

Where is the money for that store kept in

Fortier Jewelry?
A

In the front desk.

Q

Is it in the drawer?

A

Yeah.

Q

Please indicate that.

A

Sure.

Q

Where that would be.

A

Drawer right here.

Q

Okay.

Now, where were you -- let me give you a red

pen, if I could, to decide where people are.
8

In red and with a red pen indicate where you were
when you first saw the person who came in?
A

I am right here.

Q

Put an 'X 1 , red 'X' there.

From the front the part

of the store, I guess it would be on the north end?
A

Right.

Q

And where was the person who robbed you when you

first saw him?
A

First saw him?

Q

Yes.

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

He came into the store.

hello.

Just outside the door, is that correct?

What happened after you first saw this person?
I greeted him.

I said

And he said I want you to go and get me all the money

in the cash drawer right now.
Q

Where was this person when he said that?

Put a

number one there, if you would.
A

Sure.

Right here.

Q

Do you recognize the person, that said those things

to you, in the courtroom today?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

Would you point to that person and describe what that

person is wearing today.
A

It is the defendant in the yellow jumpsuit.
MR. BOWN:

Let the record reflect the identification
9

of the defendant.
THE COURT:
Q

The record will so reflect.

(BY MR. BOWN)

Tell me -- we'll get into some

other details later, but showing movement, after that was
stated to you, what did you do?
A

After that was stated, I circled around at his

request and came to the cash drawer.
Q

So in the counter-clockwise way you went around the

outside of the store?
A

Yes, around the periphery.

Q

Okay.

Where did the defendant go while you were

doing that?
A

He circled right here.

Q

Why don't you close that up and take the witness

seat.
When you first saw -- when you saw the defendant
inside the store, how was the defendant dressed?
A

The defendant was wearing a very large coat, thick

coat - - i t was brown -- and a beanie cap.
Q

Do you know what kind of pants he had on?

A

No.

Q

Was he doing anything -- let me ask you this.

Did

you see his hands?
A

I only recall -- I did not see his hands, no.

Q

Okay.

And that's a bare hand that I'm talking about.
10

A

Right.

Q

Did you see where his hands were?

A

Yes.

There was one hand in a pocket, gesturing like

there was a gun.
Q

This coat is what kind of a coat?

A

It's -- if I recall correctly it was a very thick --

thick brown coat.
Q

Wool?

Parka?

Do you recall?

A

Maybe down, if I remember correctly.

Q

Kind of puffy?

A

Yes.

Q

Would you stand, please, and indicate how you saw the

defendant's hand in his pocket?
A

Like my own pockets?

Q

No, just best you can.

A

About like this.

Q

You have it against your body?

A

Um-hum.

Q

Towards -- if I were you --

A

Yes.

Q

- - i t would be pointing at me?

A

Yeah.

Q

What did he say -- let me ask you this.

Was that the

first thing you saw or heard?
A

Yeah.

The first thing I said was hello, and the
11

first thing I heard, the response was give me all the cash in
the cash drawer.
Q

When, in relationship to that, get me all the cash in

the cash drawer, was the hand in like this?
A

The whole time.

Q

So he started out that way?

A

Started out that way.

Q

Did you move at all?

A

No.

Q

Move back and forth?

A

No.

Q

Now, you had your hand kind of tucked in?

A

Right.

Q

Your arm kind of tucked back a little bit; is that

I said okay, and I went over there.

correct?
A

Yes.

Q

So it was not pointing out far?

A

No, no.

It was definitely gesturing like there was a

weapon, but it was more subtle.

Didn't say -- something like

this, because there was a lot of other people in the store.
Q

Let me ask you this.

Who else was in the store?

A

Myself, Cherie.

Q

Besides yourself.

A

Cherie, Nelson, Dominique! Warren, and two customers.

Q

Nelson, who's that?
12

A

He's the owner of the store.

Q

And after he said get me the money in the cash

drawer, what did you do?
A

I said all right.

I circled around and came behind

the cash drawer and we met over there and I proceeded on
getting the cash.
Q

Why did you do that?

A

Because I thought he had a weapon.

Q

Did he ever say he had a weapon?

A

No.

Q

What was it that led you to believe he had a weapon?

A

The motioning in the coat pocket.

Q

When you got over to the desk, what happened there?

A

I proceeded to start getting the cash out.

thought - - w e didn't have a lot of cash.
bags for a little while.

I fumbled around with

I started with clear bags and then

grabbed a darker bag and put that in.
all you've got?"

I

And he said, "Is that

And I was like, "Yes."

And then I held out

like a roll of quarters and said, "Do you want the change?"
And he said, "Fill it with jewelry."
Q

While he's standing there, how far in front of the

desk is he?
A

He's right up against the desk.

Q

Like I am to this podium?

A

Yes.
13

Q

How high is the desk where he is standing?

A

It's probably about somewhere in here.

Q

You're indicating mid chest?

A

Yeah.

Q

Your mid chest?

A

Yes.

Q

Where did it hit?

Standing about like this.

Where did the top hit the

defendant?
A

Probably a little bit higher.

I don't recall

exactly.
Q

At that point did you see the hand that he had in the

A

No.

Q

Why is that?

A

Just the desk was too high.

Q

What happened after you gave him the bag with the

coat?

money?

Let me ask you this.
We got to the point where he said put some jewelry

in -A

Yes.

Q

What happened at that point?

A

At that time Nelson noticed something was wrong over

at the front desk and exited the store.

And at that point I

think he noticed -MR. PETERSON:

I object.

Speculation as to what
14

Nelson noticed.
THE COURT:
Q
A

Sustained.

(BY MR. BOWN)

Tell me what you saw Nelson do.

I saw Nelson exit the store.

And he said, "Just give

it to me," and I gave it to him and he ran to the front door.
Q

At any of that time -- was the defendant looking at

you all the time?

Or did he look anywhere else?

A

I can't recall.

Q

What happened after you gave him the bag?

A

He went to the front door and Nelson was on the other

side, kind of blocking him.
fucking door."

And he said, "Don't block the

And he pushed, and Nelson finally gave and he

ran out and Nelson chased him.
Q

Do you recall whether at that time he took his hand

out of the pocket?
A

I do not.

Q

Do you ever recall what was going on with his left

hand during the entire time?
A

Other than taking the bag with the money -- I can't

remember.
Q

So he took the bag of money with his left hand?

A

I can't remember.

Q

Did you ever see his right hand outside of the coat?

A

I can't remember.

Q

Okay.

What happened after the defendant made it out
15

the door?

What did you see?

A

I saw him take off running and I saw Nelson chasing

Q

Did you go out yourself and --

A

I did not.

Q

Did you know whether or not the defendant had a gun?

A

Concretely no, but I assumed so.

Q

Based on what?

A

Based on the gesturing in the pocket.

him.

MR. BOWN:

Just a moment, your Honor.

I have no further questions.
THE COURT:

Mr. Peterson.

MR. PETERSON:

Thank you, Judge.

CROSS-EXaMINi^TiaN
BY MR. EETERSCN:
Q

Andrew, when you were located where you indicated on

the diagram with the red 'X1 -A

Sure.

Q

-- I take it you could see from this position through

a glass door to the outside?
A

Yes.

Q

And how long did you observe my client outside the

A

Probably about two seconds, walking, starting toward

door?

the glass door.
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Q

Okay.

What did you observe physically about my

client as he walked toward the door?
A

Like in description of what he looked like?

Q

Um-hum.

A

Okay.

I noticed that he had on the thick puffy coat

and he had on a beanie.

I noticed that he was very bristly,

didn't shave in a day or two, and that he was coming very
determined into the store.
Q

When you say "very determined," was he walking?

A

Yes.

Q

So your sense is there was a man walking toward the

store, he's coming in the store?
A

Yes.

Q

Naturally, to get in the store he has to open the

door manually; correct?
A

Correct.

Q

Are you watching him as he comes in the door?

A

Yes, I am.

Q

Okay.

So does Mr. Ireland reach out and open the

door with his hand?
A

I do not remember.

Q

What do you remember about him opening the door?

A

Not much.

I don't remember even if he opened it

towards me or towards himself.
Q

Okay.

All right.

As he's walking toward the store
17

from the outside do you recall whether his hands are to the
side swinging freely?
A

No, I don't recall.

Q

Do you recall anything about his hands as he's

walking towards the store?
A

I do not.

Q

Do you recall whether you see Mr. Ireland carrying

anything as he comes toward the store?
A

Oh, like a bag?

Q

Or anything.

A

I didn't see him carrying anything.

Q

At any time, from the time Mr. Ireland comes into the

Fortier store until he exits and runs away, did you see him
carrying anything other than the bag you handed him?
A

No.

Q

When Mr. Ireland approached you, I take it that he

walked directly to where you indicated with a number one?
A

Yes.

Q

And at that point you say how's it going?

A

Basically, yeah.

Q

And his response is hi, how are you?

Hello.
Or what's his

response?
A

His response is I want you to go over to the cash

drawer and get me the money.
Q

So there are no pleasantries.

He just goes right to
18

the money?
A

Correct.

Q

Okay.

A

Right.

Q

And December down at the Gateway is wintertime?

A

Yes.

Q

It's cold outside?

A

Yes.

Q

People wear coats?

A

Um-hum.

Q

Not infrequently people will maybe have hands inside

We're in December when this happens, right?

a coat when they come in?
A

Sure.

Q

The exterior that we're talking about here, from the

outside of the store to the inside, is all outdoors; right?
A

Right.

Q

So you have had customers come into Fortier Jewelry

before in the wintertime with their hands inside a coat,
correct?
A

Sure.

Q

Now, let's break down for Judge Maughn everything

that my client says.
A

Okay.

Q

So when he's at position number one, that's when he

demands money.
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1

A

Yes.

Q

Does he say anything else while you are standing at

point * X1 and he's at point one?
A

He says, "I'm not kidding.

Q

How do you respond?

A

Mostly with a gesture.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

Q

Acknowledging that he demanded money?

A

Yes.

Q

Does he say anything else while he's standing at

Hurry."

Like that.

So you kind of shrug your shoulders?

1

point one?
A

No.

Q

Is it after he said that that you begin to walk

around the perimeter to the desk?
A

Yes.

Q

By the way, what prevents you from walking out the

front door?
A

Walking out the front door?

Q

Yes.

A

No.

Q

Do you say anything to anybody as you walk from the

jewelry case at point 'X' around the other case to the desk?
A

1
1

I had to pass behind Dominique and I think I said,

"Excuse me, Dominique."

1
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Q

Okay,

Did you say anything else to anyone else?

A

No.

Q

As you're walking toward the desk?

A

No.

Q

What movement does Mr. Ireland do then when you walk

around the case to the desk?
A

He just kind of comes and tracks me and comes to the

desk.
Q

So he walks across the display room floor?

A

Um-hum.

Q

Essentially in a straight line?

A

Not exactly.

Q

Okay.

More like kind of a half moon.

Keeping a certain distance.

As he's walking

in this half moon, what did you observe about my client.
A

Not much.

at that point.
Q

I was not actually looking at the client

I was looking strictly at the cash drawer.

While you're walking toward the desk do you hear my

client say anything?
A

No.

Q

Do you hear him talk to anybody else, while he's in

the store, besides you?
A

No.

Q

You get to the desk where the cash is, and where is

my client at that time?
A

At the front of the desk.
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Q

Okay,

And at that point you don't know whether he

has his hands outside his pockets or not, right?
A

Correct,

Q

He's not holding his hand in the pocket and gesturing

the pocket up toward you any longer, correct?
A

Correct,

Q

What, if anything, does Mr. Ireland say while he's at

the desk where you're getting the cash?
A

Okay.

Get the money together and give it to him.

And he says, "Is this all?"

And I said, "Want the change?"

And he's like, "Fill it with jewelry."
Q

That's it.

At any time while you're getting the cash, putting it

in the bag, does Mr. Ireland make any physical gestures toward
you?
A

No.

Q

Is there anything else that Mr. Ireland says while

he's at that desk?
A

After Nelson left the store, "Just give it to me."

Q

"Just give it to me," referring to --

A

To the bag.

Q

To the bag.

All right.

Now, you've indicated, in

answering some questions from Mr, Bown, that you felt like
there might be something in Mr, Ireland's coat pocket other
than a hand; right?
A

Yes, um-hum.
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Q

The sole reason you say that is because he lifted his

hand inside the pocket when he first encountered you where
you f re marked at point 'X1?
A

Um-hum.

Q

Yes?

A

Yes.

Q

Mr. Ireland never says anything to you about

possessing a weapon, correct?
A

Correct.

Q

Mr. Ireland never says anything to you about harming

you with a weapon, correct?
A

Correct.

Q

And Mr. Ireland never makes any statements alluding

to the possibility of shooting?
A

Correct.

Q

Or of cutting you?

A

Correct.

Q

You said to Mr. Bown your apprehension was maybe he

had a gun, right?
A

Yes, um-hum.

Q

Obviously, that's speculation on your part; right?

A

Sure, yes.

Q

Why do you speculate that he had a gun as opposed to

perhaps a knife?
A

There is no reason other than that's just what my
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mind jumped to when I saw the bulge in the pocket, pointed at
me.
And you never said anything to Mr. Ireland about

Q

what•s in the pocket?
A

No.

Q

So the bottom line, Andrew, is you don't have any

idea whether he had a weapon in his pocket or not; do you?
A

Concretely, no.
MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, could I ask that an item

be marked , please, as Defense No. 1?
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 1
was introduced.)
*

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, may I approach the

1

witness?
THE COURT:
Q

You may.

(BY MR. PETERSON)

And I m showing you a

document, which is two-sided, now marked as Defendant's Exhibit
No. 1.

Do you recognize that?

A

Yes, I do.

Q

What is that?

A

That's the statement I filled out on the night of the

robbery.
Q

And did the detective ask you to fill that out?

A

Yes.

Q

You filled this out, obviously! close in time to when
24

1

this robbery occurred; correct?
A

Correct.

Q

So that was fresh in your mind at that point, is that

correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Let me ask you to read through blocks one, two, and

three on the first page there.
A

Okay.

Out loud?

Q

No.

A

All right.

Q

Andrew, do you see anywhere in blocks one, two, or

Just to yourself.
Okay.

three where you filled out in your police statement any
indication that my client had his hand in his pocket?
A

No.

Q

Do you see anywhere in that statement to the police

where you stated anything about feeling that my client had a
weapon?
A

No.
MR. PETERSON:

If I may have just one moment, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Yes, you may.

(Mr. Peterson and the defendant confer.)
MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, may I retrieve the

statement for Mr. Bown?
THE COURT:

Yes.
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MR. PETERSON:

After Mr. Bown is through questioning

here, your Honor, I'll move admission of Defendant's Exhibit
No. 1, for the court's perusal.
THE COURT:
MR. BOWN:
THE COURT:

Any objection?
I don't, your Honor.
It will be received.

(Defendant's Exhibit No. 1
was received into evidence.)
MR. BOWN:

If I may approach the witness.

REDIRECT EXAM3mTI0N
BY MR. BOWN:
Q

Let me show you the reverse side of Defendant's

Exhibit 1.

There's some what?

Illustrations of weapons?

A

Yes.

Q

Did you, in there, write anything?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Okay.

What did you say in addition to the

description?
A

In block seven?

Q

Block seven.

A

Block seven, additional description, weapon in pocket

if there was one.
Q

So you did describe you thought there was a weapon.

A

Yes.

Q

Now, Mr. Peterson said that you speculated there was
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a gun.

Now, speculation is when there is no basis for it. Did

you have a basis for believing that there was a gun?
A

Yes.

Q

What was that?

A

Bulge in his pocket, the way it looked, pointed at

Q

Gesturing?

A

Yeah.

Q

As you were first approached and you were walking

me.

around to the desk, why didn't you walk out the front door?
A

It did not occur to me. What was going on in my mind

was there's a guy who wants money and he may have a weapon.

So

I just was compliant.
Q

Why didn't you say anything about a robbery to

Dominique?
A

Fear.

Q

Fear of what?

A

Fear of reprisal from the suspect.

Q

In what way?

A

Maybe being shot.

Q

When the defendant was in front of the desk where the

money was, was he gesturing with his hand in his coat pocket?
A

At the desk I could not see his -- that part of his

coat anymore.
Q

So you don't know if he was or was not?
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A

I don't know.

Q

Is there any question in your mind that the defendant

apparently intended to make you believe he had a gun?
A

No, there is no question.
THE COURT:

Would you repeat.

I'm not sure I got the

last part.
MR. BOWN:

Is there any question in your mind that

the defendant apparently intended to make you believe he had a
gun?
MR. PETERSON:

Well, I object.

That calls for wild

speculation.
THE COURT:

He already answered that.

asking for clarification.

I was just

If he believed, he can believe

whatever he wants.
MR. PETERSON:

Mr. Bown's asking did you believe

Mr. Ireland believed something.
THE COURT:
Q

No, that's not true.

(BY MR. BOWN)

It's -- is there any question in

your mind that the defendant apparently intended to make you
believe he had a gun?
A

No.
MR. PETERSON:

That calls for the witness to define

what my client intended.
MR. BOWN:

No.

There is an apparent intention, which

is what the statute requires.
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THE COURT:

I'm going to overrule the objection, but

you're certainly free to cross-examine him.
MR. BOWN:

I have no further questions.

RECROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. EETERSCN:
Q

Andrew, on the flip side of your witness report,

which is marked as Defendant's Exhibit 1, which has now been
admitted, when you comment about weapon in pocket, you say, "if
there was one"; right?
A

Right.

Q

So to that extent there's speculation or guesswork at

play about whether there was a weapon or not?
A

Right.
MR. PETERSON:
MR. BOWN:

No further questions.

THE COURT:
here.

That's all I have.

Mr. Reinkoester, thank you for being

Would you hand me the exhibit, please, and then you're

free to leave.
Anything further?
MR. BOWN:

That's all the witnesses I can find.

THE COURT:
MR. BOWN:

Do you want to look in the hall?
If I may.

He is not there, your Honor, so we have no further
evidence at this time.
THE COURT:

Mr. Peterson, do you intend to have any
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evidence at all?
MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, we do not.

I have advised

Mr. Ireland, of course, he has the right to testify here and it
is my advice for him that you not submit to testimony here
today.
Do you intend to follow that?
THE DEFENDANT:
MR. PETERSON:
witnesses to offer.

Sure.
Your Honor, we don't have additional

Basically this is an

eyewitness-observation issue relative to the elements in the
statute, and so we're prepared to submit on the evidence and
then move to the argument portion of the motion.
THE COURT:

Mr. Peterson, it's your motion.

Do you

want to begin?
MR. PETERSON:

Yes.

Thank you very much, Judge.

Your Honor, you've had a chance to review, I hope, a
courtesy copy of our memorandum that I submitted last week?
THE COURT:

I have.

MR. PETERSON:

And in this memorandum I cite the

Court to basically four separate cases out of this jurisdiction
that deal roughly with this issue, beginning with the
requirement in Suniville that there be some kind of an actual
showing of a facsimile.

Of course, the rationale of the

Supreme Court in that opinion was if we don't have something
realistic looking, then we really are eroding the distinction
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between a first and second-degree robbery.

And I understand

that since Suniville was handed down the legislature has
amended the language with regard to the aggravated-robbery
statute in defining dangerous weapon to include
representations.
The reason I cite the Court to the Adams opinion/
the Hartman opinion, and the other opinion inside of -- the
Candelario opinion is to suggest to the Court that appellate
courts have taken a close look at this representation language,
and although not explicitly readopting the Suniville standard
have said that there needs to be something fairly direct,
fairly poignant with regard to that representation in order for
there to be a distinction with regard to the use or represented
use of a weapon versus fear or force of fear, which is the
element in a second-degree robbery.
I would submit that the Adams, Hartman and
Candelario cases are all maintaining that the substantial step
has to at least be:

I have a weapon.

I'm going to blast you.

I f m going to shoot you. I'm going to cut you.

Something to

indicate to a victim that if there is a concealed hand, which
there was in at least one of these cases, that there be some
form of verbal representation that gives reasonable
apprehension to the victim that there is imminent danger from
the use of a weapon.
In the present case, Judge, our argument is we don ! t
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have the imminency present here.
THE COURT:

Let me ask you this question.

MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:

I understand --

Sure.

What if you had the same testimony that

was just elicited on the stand, and the defendant left -- was
apprehended as he subsequently was and he had a revolver in his
right-hand pocket.

Would he be guilty of a first degree or a

second degree?
MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:

My position is no.

No.

MR. PETERSON:

It has to be one or the other.

I'm sorry.

I thought your question

was would he be guilty of a first degree.
He would be guilty of a second degree, in my
opinion, because it's the apprehension at the time that the
robbery is occurring that's critical as opposed to the
after-developed discovery and fact that there was an actual
robbery.
THE COURT:
apprehension?

Well, what about the witness's

His testimony was I was afraid I'd get shot or

cut if I didn't.
MR. PETERSON:

Actually, his testimony was I was

afraid I would get shot, not cut.
THE COURT:
it was a weapon.

I agree he didn't say cut, but he thought

A gun versus a knife.

But my point is he

thought he would be injured.
32

MR. PETERSON:

Right. And I understand that he has

testified to that, Judge, but under cross-examination, as we
develop the testimony, he said, well, yeah, I -- that was
guesswork.

That was speculation.

It was my speculation.

Which of course he's entitled to whatever apprehension he's
entitled to.
But what I'm suggesting is when we're drawing a
distinction between a first degree and second degree, under a
Suniville type of analysis, it's not just the subjective belief
of the victim that is critical.

There's a certain objectivity

and objective legal standard that enters into play.

Otherwise,

we would simply erode the distinction between a first and a
second and leave it totally up to the subjective apprehension
of the victim.
What I'm suggesting to the court is the Suniville
case and other cases that have followed since the legislative
amendment impose a certain objective element such that the
court in the, you know, calmer light of months after the fact
can analyze whether there was a realistic apprehension of a
weapon or not.
If you deem that there was, then there is legal
sufficiency for maintaining this prosecution as a first-degree
felony.

I'm simply saying that without Mr. Ireland suggesting

he was going to shoot or cut, that the lifting of the hand was
not sufficient, under this legislative language, to elevate the
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matter from a second to a first degree.
THE COURT:

You assume Suniville is law?

MR. PETERSON:
law.

Well, I think Suniville is informative

I'm not going to say it's binding on this court because

the legislature amended the statute after the Suniville
decision and broadened the language.
at all.

I'm not here to deny that

I'm simply suggesting that a lot of the Suniville

rationale ought to be brought to bear as we analyze the
language and the other cases that have come down after the new
amendment when we talk about the dangers of eroding the first
and second-degree distinction here.
THE COURT:

Well, if you go to Adams for a minute.

MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:

Right.

That's a court of appeals decision.

Adams never mentions Suniville.
MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:

Urn-hum.

But on facts that are very, very similar,

in my mind, the court of appeals upheld the conviction that
Suniville overruled.

Do you agree with that?

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, I think that that is true.

I think that the Adams court absolutely relied on the new
language of the statute with regard to representation in
deciding to distinguish the facts of the Adams case from the
Suniville case.

But what I do also think that is critical

about Adams for the court to analyze is the verbal component
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where the defendant in that case, in addition to having the
bulge in the pocket, said that he would shoot the Taco Bell
clerk he was robbing.
THE COURT:

Anything further?

MR. PETERSON:
MR. BOWN:

No.

Thank you, Judge.

Just briefly, your Honor.

My memo

basically, is still, down to a few words is, to just read the
statute.

The statute we're talking about is 76-1-601(5) which

talks about what is a dangerous weapon, and that is referred to
in the aggravated robbery statute.
And there aren't very many people, I guess, who were
around when Suniville came down, but that was my case.
remember it very vividly.

I

I recall there was a huge outcry

after that decision came down and the legislature did, in the
very next session, amend it to this very broad language in
76-1-601, saying that, "dangerous weapon" means any item
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury -- and I
think it's not disputed that a firearm would fit in that
category -- or a facsimile or representation of the item.
In Suniville it was a prior statute, and I have it
in my memo that it was, the statute was simply used a deadly
weapon or a facsimile -- that's all it says - - o f that weapon.
Basically, the way we looked at the Suniville case
was that when you point a gun you've got to do a photocopy of a
gun and show it to them in order to have it under that
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rationale.
So the end result is that the legislature broadened
the definition of dangerous weapon and in effect told the
supreme court we exactly mean that, that if it's a verbal
representation; if it's a non-verbal representation such as
gesturing with a hand in the coat or in a pocket, that's
enough.

And if you look at the statute itself it says that if

there is not - - i f you don't have the item capable of causing
death or serious bodily injury, a facsimile or representation
of the item.

"Representation" means -- I looked in the

dictionary for what "representation" meant and several things
come out.

It means to serve as a sign or symbol of; to serve

as the counterpart or image of; to take the place of in some
respect; state in a manner intended to effect action or
judgment; to serve as a specimen, example, or instance of; to
form an image or a representation of in the mind; to correspond
to in essence.
All that means that it is in the statute.

If

someone represents, by verbal or non-verbal conduct, that they
have a weapon, that's enough.
And it says in (5)(b)(i) that the actor's use or
apparent intended use -- very broad, very low standard - - o f
the item, and that means is there something that would give
basis to someone to believe that the item is a firearm, in this
case.

And that apparent intended use leads the victim to
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reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury.
And I submit that's exactly what we have in this
case, that the victim had -- did not speculate because
speculation based on facts is not speculation.
It is not speculation at all.

It is a belief.

It is -- that f s what the witness

testified to, that he believed, I would submit, reasonably
believed based on what he saw, that the gesturing by the
defendant caused him to do things that he would not have done
otherwise.

It was all reasonable.
An apparent intended use is not -- intentionally, we

don't get into his intent.

Just his apparent intended use.

In (b)(ii) it says or the actor - - o r the actor
represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner.
There are a couple of things that were interesting
that I saw, and that is in Rule 801 of the Rules of Evidence it
defines a statement.

This is just before hearsay.

defines a statement:

Statement is an oral or written assertion

or nonverbal conduct of a person.

And it

So a statement is nonverbal

conduct or an oral or written assertion if that nonverbal
conduct is intended by the person as an assertion.
In the definition 76-1-601 an act means voluntary
bodily movement and it includes speech.
to be almost the same.

Act and statement seem

And I would submit that what the

legislature intended was that if the defendant -- if a person
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who robs somebody says he has a gun, that's enough.

If he

indicates in any other matter that he has a gun, that's enough
to make it an aggravated robbery.

And the subjective part is

if the apparent intended use leaves the victim to reasonably
believe that he has one, has a gun, that's enough.
Very broad statute, and I submit that under the
facts of this case, that contemporaneous with the demand for
money, we have a gesture which is reasonably interpreted by the
clerk that he may or may not have a gun, but he does things
because -- that he would not have done otherwise because of
that gesture.

And I submit, based on all that, that the

legislature intends that the facts of this case be charged and
constitute the offense of aggravated robbery, first-degree
felony.
THE COURT:
correct?

This statute was amended in 1989,

Or close to it?
MR. BOWN:

Close to it.

I know Suniville came out

and it was just right after that that the legislature amended
the statute.
THE COURT: Well, I have done a search in this area
and I don't pretend it to be exhaustive, but every subsequent
case indicates there has got to be something more than a bulge
in a pocket, that I can read.

And every other case takes the

definition, and if there has been a conviction upheld it's
because of some corroborating statement:

I have a gun.
38

I have

a knife.

I 1 11 use this.
Even Suniville, I think, wouldn't stand up today,

with this new definition.
MR. BOWN:
THE COURT:
MR. BOWN:

I think it would.
You think Suniville -Yes.

He had the finger and he was saying

I'll blow you away.
THE COURT:
MR. BOWN:

I mean the holding in Suniville.
Holding.

Excuse me.

Yes.

I thought you

meant the facts, and I believe you're right.
THE COURT:

So I have something here and -- but I'm

troubled by two things.

One, I don't think that employees or

anybody else should have to second-guess what is going on in an
accused's mind when they put their hand in their pocket.
Obviously, something is intended.

If nothing were intended in

this case, you walk in and say -- hands in view, whatever -give me your money.

But as soon as somebody starts to hold

their weapon in their hand in a manner which to most of us
would indicate -- certainly would indicate to me that there was
a weapon involved the way the hand is being held, the way the
command is made to get money.

I think all of us, or most

people, would be alarmed, and I think it's unfair to put the
burden upon a victim in that case and say, well, show me what's
there, at the risk of being blown away or stabbed or hit or
hurt.
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On the other hand, that may be a baseball, golf
ball, nothing.
found.

And in this case apparently no weapon was ever

That doesn't necessarily mean one wasn't used at the

time.
But, Mr. Bown, what does "represent" mean?
11

The term

representation" ?
MR. BOWN:

Honor.

That's the question I had, too, your

To represent is to make it known to other persons,

something like a gun.
THE COURT:

Well, I think you've met the statute

where it says the actor's use or apparent intended use of the
item leads the victim to reasonably believe that the item is
likely to cause death or serious injury.

Number two doesn't

apply, that the actor didn't represent verbally -- well, maybe
he did when it says any other manner he's in control of an
item.

But those are predicate to the facsimile or

representation.

That's why I ask what "representation" means.

MR. BOWN:

Well, it's not an identical thing because

that's a facsimile.

But "representation" is something that is

a sign or a symbol of, or a form, or image, or representation
of something that in the mind of someone corresponds to an
incidence.

And I would submit that a hand, an arm -- let me

put it this way.

An unseen hand in a coat pocket, especially

when it's in a gesturing mode, is in fact a representation,
nonverbal representation, I have a gun.

And he could have had
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his hand in his pocket like this, like Napoleon in his
pictures.

I don't believe that would be an indication that he

has a gun.

Or if he has his hands in his pockets and they're

down loose, not pointing at anything, I don't think that's a
representation of anything.
When it is up with an arm at almost a 90-degree
angle or near there, that's a indication, that's a
representation that there is a gun.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Peterson, I'll give you the last word if you
want.
MR. PETERSON:

Thank you, Judge.

Your Honor, I appreciate the Court's inquiry and
sensitivity to the fine distinctions that we're drawing here.
The reason I don't think the representation element
is met in this case is partly the fact sensitivity of the time
of year.

If this were the middle of July and someone is in

there with a ski parka, with a hand in his pocket you might
have more apprehension than you would in the dead of winter,
particularly the tough winter that we had here in December.
Somebody comes in with a parka on, with their hands --at least
one hand, maybe two hands, huddled up inside their coat. I
don't know about your Honor, but many times when I have my ski
jacket, or other jacket, I put my hands up in the coat and I
put my hands up at that very right angle Mr. Bown just
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indicated.

And that is not an unreasonable position, or

gesturing, for that particular time of year, particularly when
you're coming in directly from a cold street, which we have at
the Gateway Mall, into a store.
So I'm just suggesting that under the cases that
have been decided after the legislative amendment that there
needs to be at least some additional language used by
Mr. Ireland or the showing of something out of that pocket for
there to be a distinction between a first and second-degree
robbery.
THE COURT:

All right.

I will let you know within

two weeks, probably or hopefully shorter than that.
Once I have issued my decision, what is the intent
of the parties?
MR. PETERSON:

Your Honorjr if the Court decides in

the State's favor here, I have already executed a Sery plea
form that everybody has analyzed and is prepared to sign.

If

the Court rules in our favor that the elements here are only
sufficient for a second-degree robbery, I will rewrite the plea
form and Mr. Ireland will plead to the second-degree robbery.
And in that regard, Judge -- I know it doesn't go to
the merits of your decision -- I just want everyone to know
Mr. Ireland's intent has been to resolve this case and plead
this case out rather than try it.
THE COURT:

Thank you.
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Anything further, Mr. Bown?
MR. BOWN:

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, either way I go, whoever

prevails here will prepare the Findings of Fact and Order for
your Honor's signature.

In that regard I'm wondering whether

it would benefit the Court if I provided you a copy of the
transcript.
THE COURT:

If you would like to, that's fine.

MR. PETERSON:
here.

As you analyze your decision situation

In that case, I just ask that we have an expedited copy

of the transcript, if possible.
THE COURT:

Are you paying for that?

MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Fine with me.

THE DEFENDANT:
MR. BOWN:

Thank you.

Thank you, your Honor.

Are we going to have a review date?

THE COURT:

We'll set it -- if today is the 17th --

on the 29th at 8:30.
MR. PETERSON:

And you want Mr. Ireland brought up at

that point, correct?
THE COURT:

That will be fine.

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, is that your regular

Monday law and motion?
THE COURT:

Yes.
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MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Judge.

Thank you.

(Proceedings in the above-entitled matter were
concluded.)
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Addendum B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO. 031908349

:

WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND,
Defendant.

:
:

This matter was brought before the Court by Motion on March
17, 2004.

The State has brought aggravated robbery charges against

defendant William Joseph Ireland, pursuant to Section 76-6-302,
Utah Code Ann.

Mr. Ireland has waived his right to a jury trial,

and intends to enter a guilty plea.

The sole issue before the

Court is whether Mr. Ireland is guilty of a first or second degree
felony. Mr. Ireland is prepared to admit that on December 6, 2 003,
he entered Fortier Jewelers located in the Gateway Mall at 11 S.
Rio Grande Street, and demanded jewelry and money from a store
employee.
The testimony of the employee/witness established that the
defendant entered the store with his right hand in his coat pocket.
The coat was described as large and puffy, perhaps a parka. The
defendant's hand was held close to his right side, with the elbow
extending toward the back or behind the defendant.

While the
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defendant's hand was in this position, he told the witness, "I want
you to go and get me all the money in the cash drawer right now."
The witness described the defendant's action as: "There was one
hand in a pocket, gesturing like there was a gun."
11.)

The witness also described

(Hearing Tr. p.

the defendant's hand

defendant's coat pocket as "pointing at me."

in the

(Hearing Tr. p. 11.)

He further described the defendant's hand as "it was definitely
gesturing

like

there was

(Hearing Tr. p. 12.)
the

defendant

had

a weapon, but

it was

more

subtle."

The witness then testified that he thought
a

weapon

based

on

the

motioning

defendant's hand in the defendant's coat pocket.

of

the

(Hearing Tr. p.

13.)
The witness admitted he did not know whether the defendant had
a gun and that he never saw a gun, but assumed the defendant had a
gun because

of

the gesturing

defendant's coat pocket.

of

the

defendant's

(Hearing Tr. at p. 16.)

hand

in

the

Additionally,

the bulge in the defendant's pocket, and the way it looked, pointed
at the witness led the witness to believe the defendant had a
weapon.

(Hearing Tr. at p. 2 7.)

At the time of the robbery, the

witness felt that the defendant may have had a weapon in his hand,
and the witness testified that he was afraid that he might be shot
if he did not comply with the defendant's request. (Hearing Tr. at
p. 2 7.) It was the witness's further impression that the defendant
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intended to make the witness believe that the defendant had a gun
in his pocket; and he did so believe.

(Hearing Tr. at p.28.)

The issue before the Court is whether a nonverbal gesture
constitutes a "representation" of a dangerous weapon pursuant to
Section 76-1-601, Utah Code Ann.

This issue appears to be one of

first impression in the state of Utah.
In State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961

(Utah 1987), the Utah

Supreme Court overturned an aggravated robbery conviction based on
a prior statute where the defendant had stated, "This is a robbery,
don't turn it into a homicide.
962.

Give me all of your money."

Id- at

The defendant approached the teller with his right hand

inside of his coat pocket, which he lifted over the counter.
witness
pocket."

testified

that,

.Id. at 962.

"something was pointing

at me

The

in his

Based upon those facts and the statute in

effect at the time, the Supreme Court stated that the defendant had
not used a firearm, or a facsimile of a firearm, or a deadly
weapon. Id. at 965 (relying on Utah Code Ann., Section 76-6-302
(1975), which stated that " [a] person commits aggravated robbery if
in the course of committing robbery, he: (a) uses a firearm or a
facsimile of a firearm...or a deadly weapon....").
In

apparent

response

to

the

Suniville

decision,

the

legislature amended Section 76-6-302, Utah Code Ann., which reads
in pertinent part:

STATE V. IRELAND

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE 4

(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in
the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous
weapon....
Section 76-1-601, defines "dangerous weapon" as:
(a) any item capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the
item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent
intended use of the item leads the victim to
reasonably believe the item is likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) The actor represents to the
victim verbally or in any other manner that he
is in control of such an item.
A

review

of

the case

law

in

this

state

since

Suniville

indicates that convictions of defendants have been upheld where a
defendant made a verbal representation that he or she has a gun or
will use a gun or a weapon and the statement is accompanied with a
show of an apparent weapon, that is, a hand in a pocket.
e.g., State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310 (Utah A p p . 1 9 9 2 ) .

See,

This Court

must decide whether a representation may be made by a hand and
gestures of the hand absent a verbal representation.

This Court

concludes that the elements of the crime alleged in this case have
been met by the defendant's gestures as set forth above.
In the case before the Court, the witness clearly indicated he
felt the defendant had a weapon.

As the Court indicated during the

course of the hearing, it is not fair, reasonable or wise to place
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the burden upon a witness to inquire whether or not a bulge in the
defendant's pocket is or is not a weapon.
It defies logic to allow a defendant to induce a victim to
believe the defendant has a weapon and thereby coerce a victim to
perform some act based on the defendant's representations and then
allow the defendant to benefit when it is later shown the defendant
in fact had no such weapon.

The Court finds in this case that the

defendant's placement of his hand in his pocket and the gesturing
accompanying it, as testified to by the witness, constituted a
representation.

Therefore, the State is within its discretion in

charging this matter as a first degree felony.
Although the statutory language governing aggravated robbery
seems to clearly encompass the defendant's actions, this Court is
further persuaded that the defendant can be charged with aggravated
robbery by the case law of other states interpreting statutes
similar to ours.

Whether a weapon or a facsimile is actually

displayed in the commission of a crime, or a verbal representation
that such a weapon is in the possession of the perpetrator, or
whether the representation is made by menacing gestures, the effect
is the same on the victim. A facsimile of a gun can cause no more
harm than leading one to believe the perpetrator actually has a
gun, whether by word or action.
that found in New York.

The Utah statute is similar to

New York's law reads:
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A person is guilty of robbery in the second
degree if he forcibly steals property and if,
in the course of the commission of the crime
he "[displays] what appears to be a pistol,
revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, or
other firearm."
N.Y. Penal Law § 160.10(2) (b) , as quoted in People v. Knowles, 436
N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1981).

The Supreme Court appellate division

of New York held in Knowles:
We hold today that if a person who is in fact
unarmed commits a robbery and, in the course
thereof, positions his hand in his pocket in a
manner that is intended to convey to his
victim the impression that he is holding a
firearm, that said person has committed
robbery in the second degree within the
meaning of the statute quoted above.
436 N.Y.2d at 25.
Delaware's statute is also similar to Utah's, and in State v.
Lawrence, 2001 Del. Super. Lexis 318
2001),

aff'd,

790

A.2d

476

(Del.

(Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28,

2002),

held

that

the

term

"displays" included a defendant's act of wrapping a cloth around
his hand so that it appeared to hide a gun, and where the victim
reasonably felt- that the defendant was armed.
The facts of this case are very similar to Deleon v. Arkansas,
1989 Ark. App., Lexis 608 (1999) , which interpreted another statute
much like Utah's.

In Deleon, the defendant entered a convenience

store to purchase a pack of cigarettes, and stated to the clerk,
"Would you mind filling me up a sack?"

JEd. at * 2 . As the clerk
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reached for a bag, he noticed that the man had his hand in his
pocket. Id. The clerk testified, "I figured he had a weapon in his
pocket or a gun."

Id.

The Court of Appeals of Arkansas stated

that when the defendant put his hand in his pocket, he did so "for
the purpose of inducing the belief that he was armed with a deadly
weapon and that although he used no threatening words [as to the
use of a weapon] , his conduct had the desired effect upon the
victim," who perceived the defendant's actions to be menacing or
threatening.

I_d. at *4.

This Court believes that the reasoning of these cases is sound
and consistent with the terms of Utah's revised statute, and
concludes that
threatening

"representation"

gestures

includes not only words, but

and movements

which would

indicate

the

defendant is in possession of a dangerous weapon.
The State's filing of this action as a first degree felony is
upheld.

i
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